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Abstract
This study instead focuses on culture wars among religious elites—clergy—and tests three aspects
of the culture wars thesis: (1) whether cultural wars exist at all among religious elites, (2) whether
clergy attitudes are polarized on these issues, and (3) whether religious authority or religious
affiliation is more salient in creating culture wars cleavages. Using data from a large random
sample of Protestant clergy, we find a substantial amount of engagement in culture wars by all
types of Protestant clergy. The amount of polarization is more attributable to views of religious
authority (i.e., biblical inerrancy) than to religious tradition. Moreover, polarization among clergy
is somewhat more evident on culture wars issues than on other social and political issues. These
findings are generally supportive of the culture wars thesis and should help return examinations of
culture wars back to where they were originally theorized to be waged: among elites.
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Introduction
James Davison Hunter’s (1991) influential book, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America, argues that American elites, including leaders of religious institutions, are reaching
across old boundaries and forging new alliances. Rather than the old divisions along
denominational lines, America’s religious leaders are aligning on polar opposite sides of
hot-button issues based on their relative orthodox or progressive approach to religious,
social, and political issues.1 Thus, conservative Catholics, evangelicals, Mormons, and
orthodox Jews are more likely to ally with each other than with those from their own
traditions who have more progressive leanings. The core issue, Hunter argues, is one’s
approach to authority. Those who rely on an absolute standard of truth, like the Bible or the
Magisterium, tend to fall one on side of the cleavage, while those with a more relative
approach tend to come down on the other. This restructuring of cultural divides has occurred
as leaders vie for dominance over electoral and legislative politics, judicial appointments
and rulings, educational policies, and cultural symbols. These “culture wars,” as Hunter
Correspondence should be addressed to Jeremy E. Uecker, Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
CB# 8120, University Square, 123 West Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524. uecker@unc.edu.
1Certainly denominational identity and one’s approach to authority are correlated. New groups are often formed as a result of such
issues as was the case recently with the formation of the Anglican Church in North America and the Lutheran Congregations in
Mission for Christ, to name just two examples. These splits reveal continued intradenominational heterogeneity on issues of authority,
especially among mainline Protestant denominations. Denominational affiliation is often a marker of more than simple approach to
authority or religious belief; it is often tied to ethnic heritage, preferred organizational structure, and more.
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termed them, are fought over issues like abortion, the arts, education, the judiciary,
pornography, and the family.
The popular conception of Hunter’s culture wars thesis has been that of a cleavage in the
opinions of average Americans on these issues.2 Sociological scrutiny of this version of the
culture wars thesis has led to sharp criticism. Most prominently, DiMaggio, Evans, and
Bryson (1996) examine whether polarization in American public opinion actually occurred
between the 1970s and 1990s. They find mostly shared views among Americans on
supposedly contentious matters, except on the abortion issue which more closely
approximates the culture wars thesis—and even that finding has been contested on
methodological grounds (Mouw and Sobel 2001). If any polarization exists, it is among
those who identify as either Democrat or Republican (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996;
Evans 2003), though even this reflects shifts in political party agendas rather than change in
Americans’ attitudes (Miller and Hoffmann 1999; Layman 2001). Similarly, a study of
American evangelicals employing in-depth qualitative interviews suggests that the issues,
public figures, and terms of the “culture wars” are unknown to rank-and-file evangelicals
(Smith et. al 1997). Another study of two hundred Americans using in-depth qualitative
interviews reports that the majority of middle class Americans share most opinions and are
not engaged in the culture wars (Wolfe 1999). Utilizing multiple quantitative datasets,
including opinion polling and election returns, political scientist Morris Fiorina and his
colleagues (2005) find a muddled-middle on issue after issue. While Americans are divided,
the divisions are close, with millions of average Americans in the middle, sharing some
views from one side of the cleavage and some views from the other side.
These critiques of the culture wars thesis are interesting regarding the question of
widespread American division, but they are tests of the popular conception of culture wars
perpetuated by the media, not of Hunter’s original scholarly thesis. Hunter writes:
While ordinary people participate in the construction of their own private worlds,
the development and articulation of the more elaborate systems of meaning,
including the realm of public culture, falls almost always to the realm of elites.
They are the ones who create the concepts, supply the language, and explicate the
logic of public discussion. They are the ones who define and redefine the meaning
of public symbols. Public discourse, then, is largely a discourse of elites (Hunter
1991:59; emphasis in original).
According to the culture wars thesis the primary combatants are not average Americans but
rather elites, particularly knowledge workers who have some measure of control over the
means of cultural production. Among other types of elites, public policy specialists,
lobbyists, public interest lawyers, writers, activists, journalists, community organizers, and,
significantly, clergy have resources that allow them to generate and modify cultural
symbols. A scholarly consensus appears to have emerged that American political elites have
indeed become more polarized even as the American public has not (Hunter and Wolfe
2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009). Culture wars may or may not
be an apt description of what is occurring around the country in America’s religious
institutions among America’s religious elites: clergy. Clergy stand at the intersection of
multiple institutions. Ministers, particularly in mainline Protestant traditions that privilege
an “educated clergy,” possess significant educational achievement and thus they broker
intellectual content to their congregations. By definition they are religious leaders whose
vocation requires deep involvement in the most important and intimate aspects of meaning
and moral order in their parishioners’ lives. These individuals may have more influence over
2One critic suggests this stems from Hunter’s use of public opinion data to support his arguments about elites (Evans 2003).
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ordinary Americans than national media and political elites. It is this meso-level of the social
world—clergy of local religious congregations—which this study examines.
There is a substantial literature on the role of clergy in politics (see Olson 2009 for a recent
review), much of which is relevant to the culture wars thesis. Guth and his colleagues
(1997), similar to Hunter (1991), argue that Protestant clergy develop social theologies from
their orthodox or modernist perspectives, the former taking an individualist approach—
merged with a “civic gospel” understanding wherein politics serves to maintain order and
protect individuals, families and religion—that leads to a moral reform agenda, and the latter
taking a communitarian approach with an emphasis on a social justice agenda. Thus, the
most orthodox Protestant clergy are the most likely to publicly address what they perceive to
be moral issues, namely culture wars issues like family issues, abortion, pornography,
homosexuality, education issues, school prayer, and others. In contrast, the most modernist
clergy are the most likely to address what they perceive to be social justice issues like
poverty and the environment. Moreover, they find, relative orthodoxy is more influential
than denomination, eschatology, or religious movement in determining clergy stance on
most political and social issues examined (with the sole exceptions of environmental
protection and tuition tax credits), including culture wars issues like abortion, prayer in
schools, gay rights, abstinence-based sex education, and teaching creationism.
Although these findings are important for understanding religious elites’ political and social
attitudes, as well as their proclivity to get involved in culture wars by publicly addressing
those issues, they are less helpful for understanding polarization among religious elites, a
central tenet of the culture wars thesis. Following closely the approach of DiMaggio and
colleagues’ (1996), we identify and examine four dimensions of polarization: (a)
consolidation, (b) dispersion, (c) bimodality, and (d) constraint. More thorough explanation
of these dimensions and their measurement can be found in DiMaggio et al. (1996).
Consolidation refers to both between-group differences and within-group differences. When
consolidation is most pronounced, differences between social groups (e.g., the orthodox
versus the progressive) will be large and within-group variation will be small. Between-
group difference is the dimension of polarization typically explored by researchers in the
way of mean differences, or perhaps the proportion of a group taking an extreme position on
an issue. Examples of this type of investigation among clergy are sparse, but one example is
Johnson’s (1998:285) polarization index, created by “summing the percentage differences
between theological liberals and conservatives on the two extreme responses for each item.”
Johnson reports high polarization on many issues among Oregon clergy from four Protestant
denominations, including culture wars issues like abortion, homosexuality, advertising
condoms on television, the Equal Rights Amendment, and school prayer. Similarly, Smidt
(2004) constructs scores based on responses to moral policy questions, social-welfare policy
questions, party identification, and presidential vote and finds increasing disparity between
evangelical and mainline clergy on all four, but especially social-welfare policy and party
identification. On moral policy, the difference was only one point greater in 2001 than in
1989 on a scale ranging from −100 to 100, which suggests no change in polarization by
religious tradition on culture wars issues during that time. Finally, though polarization and
culture wars were not the focus of their study, Jelen and Lockett (2010) find that 42 percent
of evangelical clergy strongly agree that creationism should be taught in public schools
while 22 percent of mainline clergy strongly disagree.
Dispersion simply refers to how spread out the distribution of responses is. If a population is
more polarized, there will be greater variance in responses to the survey. The variance
measures the average distance on the scale of two randomly-selected respondents; thus,
greater variance indicates greater dispersion and more polarization.
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Bimodality measures the extent to which respondents fall into two separate categories on a
measure. Bimodality is measured by kurtosis. A normally distributed variable has a kurtosis
of zero. A variable on which there is a great deal of consensus will have a peaked
distribution and a positive kurtosis. A variable on which there is polarization—settling into
two camps—has a negative kurtosis. A perfectly bimodal distribution (with 50 percent in
each group) will have a kurtosis of −2. Importantly, kurtosis by itself does not indicate
polarization. It does not speak to the distance between responses (e.g., a variable with 50
percent of respondents agreeing and 50 percent strongly agreeing would have a kurtosis of
−2). But when interpreted in combination with the variable’s mean and variance it can be
useful for identifying polarization.
Constraint refers to the correlation among variables within a particular domain and is
typically measured with statistics such as the alpha coefficient of reliability or average inter-
item correlations. It speaks to the amount of ideological cohesion among respondents
(Converse 1964). Some have suggested that the moral-reform and social-justice agendas of
clergy identified by Guth et al. (1997) and Smidt (2004)—among others—point to high
levels of attitudinal constraint (Jelen 2009). This is likely the case, though those studies only
hint at constraint and do not show the correlations of attitudes within individuals. In another
study, religious elites were found to have high levels of constraint—on par with that of
government elites (Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman 1991).
Few studies, then, have examined the polarization of clergy in detail. Rather, the study of
culture wars involvement and polarization among clergy is fragmented and, in many ways,
incomplete. The aims of this study are thus straightforward. The first aim is simply to
answer the question, “How many clergy frequently address culture wars issues?” In other
words, we seek to assess to what extent clergy are actually active in the culture wars, or put
another way, to what extent culture wars actually exist among these religious elites. Our
approach here is similar to that of Guth et al. (1997), but we include it here to examine—
using newer data from a wider range of clergy—whether culture wars issues pervade the
public discourse of clergy. Our second aim is to test Hunter’s hypothesis regarding the
polarization of elites on culture wars issues. Do clergy take up strongly-held positions for or
against certain culture wars issues? Are their attitudes dispersed and bimodal? Do they
exhibit attitudinal constraint? Our third goal is to determine whether religious orthodoxy is
more or less predictive of culture wars positions than religious tradition. Hunter’s culture
wars thesis, to reiterate, suggests orthodoxy should be the predominant factor influencing
polarization. Throughout we also focus our attention on whether these processes are
restricted to what is typically conceived of as culture wars issues, or whether they extend
beyond those issues to stances on other social and political issues. We address and answer
these questions using data from more than 7,000 evangelical and mainline Protestant clergy
collected in 2001. The result is the most comprehensive assessment of the culture wars
thesis among religious elites to date.
METHODS
Data
The Cooperative Clergy Survey was collected in 2001 to better understand the social and
political engagement of American clergy. Survey questionnaires were mailed to random
samples of clergy from 20 traditions (17 Protestant denominations, Catholic priests, Jewish
rabbis, and Unitarian Universalists), as well as a sample of clergy belonging to the Willow
Creek Association. Because the data only include appropriate measures for Protestant clergy
—the only question on religious authority refers to the inerrancy of the Bible and not church
teachings or the Torah—we restrict our data to Protestant clergy. Furthermore, because the
Willow Creek Association spans denominations, we exclude these pastors from the analysis,
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along with the two black Protestant denominations—the African Methodist Episcopal
(AME) Church and the Church of God in Christ—because of their small sample sizes and
their distinct social history. The remaining sample consists of clergy from nine evangelical
denominations and six mainline denominations. The evangelical denominations represented
are Assemblies of God, Christian Reformed Church, Church of Christ, Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, Nazarene, Presbyterian Church in America, Southern Baptist Convention,
Mennonite, and Evangelical Free Church. The mainline denominations are American
Baptists, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church
(USA), Reformed Church in America, and United Methodist Church. The total sample size,
prior to listwise deletion of missing data, is 7,170. More information about the Cooperative
Clergy Study is available in Smidt (2003).
Measures
Dependent Variables—The first set of dependent variables measures the frequency with
which clergy publicly address certain contentious issues, both culture wars issues and other
social and political issues. Respondents were asked, “If you have made your views known
publicly in any way, how often have you addressed the following issues?” Response
categories were never, seldom, often, and very often. For this study, we dichotomize these
variables such that those reporting addressing issues often or very often are coded 1 and all
others are coded 0.
The second set of dependent variables measures clergy’s stance on certain social and
political issues. These questions are all five-point Likert items wherein respondents could
report that they strongly disagree, disagree, are not sure, agree, or strongly agree with a
series of statements. The statements we analyze are included verbatim in Tables 2 and 3.
Responses are coded 1–5 such that higher numbers represent more agreement with the
statement. Certainly these measures are not perfect measures for understanding culture wars
stances since they often incorporate political solutions to the issues that may introduce less
agreement (e.g., a pastor could strongly agree that abortion is wrong but not strongly agree
that a constitutional amendment is a proper legislative approach to the issue). Still, these
measures are likely to be highly correlated with pure attitudinal measures, and we know of
no available data on clergy that better tests these concepts.
Independent Variables
We include only two independent variables. The first is the religious tradition of the clergy,
dichotomized into evangelical and mainline traditions as described above. (For the model-fit
analysis in Table 6, denomination information is used to provide a stricter test of the
orthodoxy-versus-tradition question.) The second is a measure of religious authority and is
an item about belief in the inerrancy of the Bible. Respondents could strongly disagree,
disagree, say they were not sure, agree, or strongly agree with the statement, “The Bible is
the inerrant Word of God, both in matters of faith and in historic, geographical and other
secular matters.” This variable is dichotomized into those who agree and those who disagree
with the Bible being inerrant (those who are “not sure” are not included in either group)
except in Table 6, where it is a series of five dummy variables (with strongly disagree as the
omitted reference group). Religious tradition and religious orthodoxy are used because we
are interested in testing theoretically-derived hypotheses from Hunter’s culture wars
argument, not estimating full models predicting polarized positions. In ancillary analyses
(see footnote 6), standard demographic controls are included. The results do not
substantively alter the conclusions.3
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We begin by assessing the extent to which clergy are engaged in culture wars issues by
reporting the percent of clergy who frequently (i.e., often or very often) address these issues
publically—as well as, for comparative purposes, other issues. Table 1 reports percentages
for the full sample, and then for subgroups of clergy by religious tradition and beliefs about
biblical inerrancy. We then examine polarization in clergy stances on culture wars issues.
Tables 2 and 3 examine the percent of clergy who strongly disagree and strongly agree with
each statement about culture wars issues (Table 2) and other social and political issues
(Table 3). Again, we report these percentages overall, by religious tradition, and by beliefs
about biblical inerrancy. These tables reveal the prevalence of extreme positions among
clergy on culture wars and other issues (i.e., clergy consolidation and bimodality at the
poles). In Table 4, we present additional data on the distribution of attitudes on these issues.
We report the mean, variance, and kurtosis of each variable among the full sample of clergy
and within their respective subgroups. These statistics illuminate the extent of dispersion,
bimodality, and consolidation among clergy. Table 5 reports the alpha coefficient of
reliability (calculated from polychoric correlations among variables) and the average
interitem polychoric correlations among responses to all issues, culture wars issues, and
other political and social issues. These statistics show the amount of constraint among clergy
on these issues. Because these statistics are affected not only by the association among
beliefs but also by the variance within populations (Barton and Parsons 1977), we do not
make subgroup (e.g., orthodoxy vs. tradition) comparisons for these statistics. Finally, Table
6 tests which variable—religious tradition or religious orthodoxy—better predicts polarized
stances on each of the issues. We do this by comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion
approximation (BIC′) from each model (see Raftery 1995). This statistic is useful for
comparing two non-nested models. BIC′ is given by
where −χ2k0 is the likelihood ratio test statistic for testing a null model (i.e., a model with no
independent variables) against the model of interest, where pk is the number of independent
variables in the model of interest, and where n is the sample size. A smaller (more negative)
value indicates better model fit. In comparing models, a BIC′ difference of 10 or higher is
considered very strong support for the better-fitting model (Raftery 1995). Finally, it is
important to note that DiMaggio and colleagues (1996) define polarization as both a state
(i.e., the state of being polarized) and a process (i.e., the process of becoming more
polarized). Both are important, but given our cross-sectional data we are only able to assess
polarization as a state among Protestant clergy in America.
Results
Are Protestant clergy publicly participating in culture wars issues? Table 1 suggests the
answer to this question is “yes,” though clergy are more involved in some issues than others,
and their involvement varies by their religious tradition and their beliefs about the Bible.
3We also considered including political party affiliation as a third independent variable but ultimately decided, following Guth and
colleagues (1997), that these affiliations are endogenous to religious orthodoxy. Moreover, party identification is often determined by
one’s stance on key issues like the ones we examine (e.g., people identify as Democrat because they believe the government should do
more about social problems). Despite these issues, we compared the explanatory power of religious orthodoxy to that of political party
affiliation. For 17 out of the 22 culture wars outcomes in Table 6, religious orthodoxy provided better model fit than did party
affiliation. For non-culture wars issues, however, party affiliation was superior: 17 out of 20 of the outcomes were better explained by
party affiliation. In models including both orthodoxy and party affiliation measures, both have independent influence on each of the
attitudes examined as outcomes.
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Overall, clergy are most likely to talk publicly about abortion. About half publicly address
homosexuality and gender equality, and about one third address public education and school
prayer. On abortion, evangelical clergy and biblical inerrantists far outpace their
counterparts. They are also more likely to publicly address gay rights and homosexuality
and school prayer, but the gaps here are less extreme. About one third of all types of clergy
address public education and school choice.
Protestant clergy appear to be much more willing to take up culture wars issues—especially
abortion, homosexuality, and gender equality—than they do other issues. Clergy are about
as likely to talk publicly about environmental problems, health care, and Israel and the
Middle East as they are educational culture wars issues like school choice and school prayer,
with around a third of all clergy reporting publicly addressing these issues often or very
often. Capital punishment is also addressed frequently by about 28 percent of all clergy in
the sample, but other issues like national defense, gun laws, and immigration lag farther
behind: One fifth or fewer of all clergy talk frequently about these contentious issues. Unlike
with culture wars issues, evangelicals and inerrantists are much less likely than their
counterparts to talk about the environment or health care. In sum, culture wars issues are
more likely than others to pepper the public discourse of all types of clergy, though
mainliners and modernists are also likely to talk often about the environment and health
care.
We now turn directly to the issue of clergy polarization. Table 2 displays the percentage of
clergy taking extreme positions on different culture wars issues highlighted in Hunter’s
(1991) original argument: issues of family, education, and religion’s role in public life.4 On
many issues we see nontrivial minorities occupying both poles of the distribution. For
example, 32 percent of clergy strongly agree that we need a constitutional amendment
dealing with abortion while 16 percent strongly disagree with such a measure. With respect
to gay rights, 22 percent strongly agree homosexuals should have the same rights and
privileges as others and 15 percent strongly disagree. On teaching creationism, 29 percent
strongly agree and 12 percent strongly disagree. Educational issues like focusing on public
school improvement, providing vouchers, and school prayer all garner significant minorities
at both extremes. There appears to be a great deal of consensus, however, on the issue of sex
education programs being abstinence based.5 Only 2 percent strongly disagree, compared to
41 percent who strongly agree. There also appears to be little extreme disagreement with
statements about impediments to religious freedom and the government’s efforts to protect
America’s religious heritage. Fewer than 10 percent of clergy fall on either extreme with
respect to women’s rights legislation and the perceived threat to civil liberties posed by
people imposing their religion on others.
Hunter argues that culture wars cleavages are more a function of relative orthodoxy and less
of religious tradition. The findings in Table 2 provide support for that argument. Although
there is plenty of polarization by religious tradition, the between-group polarization is larger
between the orthodox and modernists than it is between evangelicals and mainliners.
Moreover, the within-group variance is larger among those in the same religious tradition
than among those with the same approach to the Bible, especially when looking at mainline
Protestants and modernists. There is a moderate amount of within-group variance among
mainline Protestants that is not seen among the modernist group, presumably because the
mainline traditions still house significant numbers of orthodox clergy. Evangelical
traditions, on the other hand, track more closely with the orthodox group since few
4Hunter highlighted other culture wars battlefields, like media and arts, but we do not have data available for those issues.
5Perhaps more polarization would be evident had clergy been queried about abstinence-only sex education and not abstinence-based
sex education.
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evangelical pastors reject biblical inerrancy. Hunter’s argument about the orthodox versus
the progressive garners significant support here.
Table 3 is similar to Table 2 but shows the percentage of clergy at each pole for non-culture
wars issues. The most polarized issue here appears to be capital punishment, with 20 percent
of clergy strongly opposing it and 24 percent strongly supporting it. Handgun ownership,
national health care, and the Middle East peace process all have more than 10 percent of
clergy at each pole. Many other issues, including government-sponsored social services,
welfare laws, defense spending, and affirmative action, are not so polarized. Even
environmental issues are not highly polarized by this measure.
In sum, Table 2 suggests relatively high levels of consolidation and bimodality among
clergy and suggests polarization is more apt to occur between orthodox and progressive
clergy than between evangelical and mainline clergy. There appears to be more polarization
on culture wars issues than others, though issues like health care, gun ownership, and capital
punishment also exhibit significant amounts of polarization (in Table 3).
Table 4 looks at dispersion (i.e., overall variance) on these issues, and is another way to look
at consolidation (i.e., mean differences, within-group variance) and bimodality (i.e.,
kurtosis). The issues with the most dispersion are the abortion amendment and capital
punishment. Other issues with relatively high dispersion include gay rights, the focus of
education policy, vouchers, creationism, school prayer, handguns, and national health care.
Most of the family- and education-oriented culture wars issues have high dispersion—with
the exceptions of women’s rights and abstinence-based education—but the religion-in-
public-life issues are less dispersed. The distributions of most of the other social and
political issues—the role of government, the environment, welfare reform, military
spending, affirmative action, and Israel and the Middle East—are not as dispersed as the
family and education culture wars issues. Table 4 also reveals a great deal of bimodality
among these issues, particularly abortion, gay rights, approaches to education policy, and
school vouchers among the culture wars issues, and the role of the federal government in
solving social problems, handgun policy, national health insurance, and capital punishment
among the other social and political issues.
The between-group mean differences in Table 4 suggest, as was suggested in Table 2, that
clergy are more polarized by their orthodoxy than by their religious tradition. On all of the
culture wars issues, the mean differences between those who agree and disagree the Bible is
inerrant are larger than the mean differences between evangelical and mainline Protestants.
The same is true for the other social and political issues. There is also evidence for more
within-group consolidation among the orthodox and modernist groups than among
evangelicals and mainliners. In general, the variance is lower and the kurtosis is higher in
the orthodox-progressive samples than in the evangelical-mainline samples. This is
especially evident among those who disagree the Bible is inerrant versus mainline
Protestants. There is much more consensus among the former group than among the latter;
indeed, the diversity of the mainline is one of the consistent themes of our findings.
Attitudinal constraint (Table 5) appears to be high among clergy. Even on a broad index of
items such as those examined here, clergy exhibit relatively high levels of constraint with
the average inter-item polychoric correlation measuring .46 for the full index of issues.
These correlations are also high among the culture wars and non-culture wars sub-indexes.
This suggests that clergy, like other elites, exhibit a high amount of attitude constraint.
Finally, Table 6 compares the Bayesian Information Criterion approximation (BIC′) of two
logit regression models predicting the two poles of each issue. We test whether religious
tradition—measured by the respondents’ denominational affiliation—or religious orthodoxy
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provide better model fit for predicting polarized stances. The evidence is clear: Orthodoxy is
a better predictor of polarized stances (at both poles) on culture wars issues than is religious
tradition. The evidence for other social and political issues is a bit more mixed; orthodoxy
trumps tradition on most issues, except for strong disagreements about the legitimacy of the
federal government in solving social problems, increased military spending, national health
insurance, and opposition to capital punishment, where tradition appears to play a more
pivotal role. The mean difference in BIC′ by orthodoxy and tradition is much larger among
the culture wars issues than among the other issues, further suggesting an especially strong
association between religious orthodoxy and culture wars issues (vis-à-vis religious
tradition).6
Conclusion
Using data from a large random sample of clergy from a number of Protestant
denominations, we have tested several aspects of Hunter’s (1991) culture wars thesis. Rather
than study the attitudes and behaviors of the American public or those of political elites, we
have examined the attitudes and behaviors of religious elites in local communities: the
pastors of local congregations. First, our results indicate that Protestant clergy are often
engaged in culture wars issues, though there is plenty of variation in which issues they are
willing to take up. Nevertheless, clergy do appear to be engaged in culture wars in a public
fashion, and more so than in other contentious issues with perhaps the exception of the
environment, health care, and Israel, where their participation rivals less-often addressed
culture wars issues like public education and school prayer.
Second, there does seem to be a significant amount of polarization on many culture wars
issues among religious elites, particularly abortion, homosexuality, public education and
school choice, creationism, and school prayer. Significant minorities (i.e., greater than 10
percent) occupy each pole on these measures, the variance of responses on these measures is
relatively high, and the kurtosis is very low (approaching the lower bound of −2). Attitudinal
constraint is also very high—a finding typical of studies of elites whose work with ideas and
values make them more likely to familiarize themselves with these issues (Converse 1964;
Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman 1991). Culture wars issues do seem more polarized than other
social and political issues, though polarization is evident for issues like capital punishment,
handgun policy, and national health care as well. Culture wars issues attract clergy resources
because the issues concern radical debates about interrelated matters of authority, moral
order, religion and knowledge—concerns of particular salience to religious leaders.
Moreover, in the contemporary social context in which religion inhabits a significantly
privatized sphere, clergy may demur from addressing “secular” topics that occupy attention
in the public sphere, whereas culture wars issues sourced in meaning and moral order are
perceived as appropriate domains of clergy concern. We acknowledge that there is
subjectivity in assessing levels of polarization (i.e., the state of polarization), more so than in
assessing trends (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Although some may quibble with our
interpretation, we believe this at the very least provides a baseline assessment of polarization
and also likely reflects more polarization than among the mass public, where just 5–7
percent of the population is thought to inhabit each pole of the distribution on these types of
issues (Hunter and Wolfe 2006).
6Results from models with controls for age, gender, race, education, and marital status produced substantively similar results in almost
all cases. The notable exceptions were for models predicting strong disagreement with the statement about the federal government’s
role in solving social problems, where the evidence for tradition’s superiority is weak (a BIC difference of 1.59); and for the models
predicting strong disagreement with opposition to the death penalty, where the orthodoxy variable emerges as more predictive with a
BIC difference of 17.77.
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Third, and finally, as Hunter argued, we find significant evidence that the cleavages in
culture wars issues among clergy are more beholden to issues of religious authority—in the
case of Protestants, biblical inerrancy—than they are to religious tradition. Both matter, but
religious authority matters more. Consolidation at opposite extremes of the distribution is
higher when the sample is split by orthodoxy than when split by religious tradition. Mean
differences between groups are larger, and dispersion (i.e., variance) and bimodality (i.e.,
kurtosis) within groups tends to be lower. Orthodoxy is a better predictor of extreme
positions on culture wars issues than is religious tradition. The driving factor here appears to
be variation among mainline Protestants, many of whom are religiously orthodox and who
are more likely to side with their orthodox colleagues than with their mainline ones. Culture
wars issues are especially and fundamentally about differences in meaning and moral order
that emerge from one’s understanding of ultimate authority, not mere group identification
(though that also matters) (Hunter 1991). This is especially relevant for clergy who often
form their social attitudes based on their theological beliefs (Guth et al. 1997). Thus, we find
general support for Hunter’s argument among Protestant clergy.
There is much more empirical work to be done to explain the nature of culture wars in
American society, among clergy and among other elites. We would benefit greatly from
nationally-representative data sets that ask direct questions about culture wars attitudes
among clergy, that measure issues of religious authority across a wider religious spectrum,
and that is collected longitudinally. In lieu of such data, however, we have presented some
evidence in support of three aspects of Hunter’s culture wars thesis: (1) that they exist
among Protestant clergy, (2) that Protestant clergy are, somewhat, though not completely,
polarized in their attitudes on these matters, and (3) that Protestant clergy coalesce on
different sides of culture wars issues based more on their view of religious authority than on
their denominational affiliation. Additionally, this study should serve to encourage scholars
to evaluate the culture wars thesis for what it is—a thesis about elite discourse—and not for
what it is not—a thesis about the attitudes of average Americans. Future research might also
analyze multilevel data from congregations (i.e., clergy and parishioners) to examine
whether clergy’s culture war involvement has an influence on the attitudes of the people in
their congregations.
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Table 5
Alpha coefficients of reliability and average interitem polychoric correlations for indexes of issues
α ρ
All issues .95 .46
Culture wars issues .90 .45
Other issues .92 .54













Uecker and Lucke Page 19
Table 6
Strength of support for competing models (religious tradition versus religious orthodoxy) predicting strongly
agree and strongly disagree with culture wars and other social and political issues, based on difference in
Bayesian Information Criterion Approximation (BIC′)
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Model supported Difference in BIC′ Model supported Difference in BIC′
Culture Wars Issues
Abortion amendment Orthodoxy 624.06 Orthodoxy 750.20
Gay rights Orthodoxy 796.51 Orthodoxy 244.88
Women’s rights Orthodoxya 212.96a Orthodoxy 127.96
Public school-focused education policy Orthodoxy 258.87 Orthodoxy 18.12
Abstinence-based sex education Orthodoxy 580.72 Orthodoxy 117.14
School vouchers Orthodoxy 76.65 Orthodoxy 350.55
Creationism in schools Orthodoxy 628.79 Orthodoxy 697.13
School prayer amendment Orthodoxy 118.41 Orthodoxy 685.96
Civil liberties threatened by religion Orthodoxy 227.58 Orthodoxy 175.16
Protect America’s religious heritage Orthodoxy 102.24 Orthodoxy 196.41
Religious freedom threatened Orthodoxy 365.68 Orthodoxy 233.22
Mean BIC′ for orthodoxy models −965.59 −701.33
Mean BIC′ for tradition models −602.64 −374.36
Other Social and Political Issues
Federal government as social problem-solver Orthodoxy 177.07 Tradition 23.62
Government vs. private enterprise Orthodoxy 66.58 Orthodoxy 310.88
Environmental protection Orthodoxy 415.94 Orthodoxy 134.48
Welfare reform laws Orthodoxy 226.01 Orthodoxy 99.06
Military spending Orthodoxy 40.29 Tradition 226.60
Affirmative action for minorities Orthodoxya 176.26a Orthodoxy 88.33
Handguns Orthodoxy 396.48 Orthodoxy 40.86
National health insurance Orthodoxy 130.17 Tradition 48.80
Middle East peace Orthodoxy 289.59 Orthodoxy 36.25
Capital punishment Orthodoxy 153.95 Tradition 50.20
Mean BIC′ for orthodoxy models −652.85 −561.05
Mean BIC′ for tradition models −445.62 −524.99
Notes: Religious tradition is a series of dummy variables measuring denominational affiliation. Religious orthodoxy is a series of dummy variables
measuring belief about biblical inerrancy. Strength of support considered “very strong” (99 percent probability that model is superior) if difference
in BIC′ is greater than 10 (Raftery 1995).
a
Calculated without observations from one denomination because none of the respondents from that denomination strongly agreed with the
statement.
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